Now, in our case we decide that we don’t want to reveal that indeed the resource is available to anyone who doesn’t have access. If the server does not wish to make this information available to the client, the status code 404 (Not Found) can be used instead. If the request method was not HEAD and the server wishes to make public why the request has not been fulfilled, it SHOULD describe the reason for the refusal in the entity. Authorization will not help and the request SHOULD NOT be repeated. 403 Forbidden: The server understood the request, but is refusing to fulfill it. Unfortunately, whether we don’t have authorization or the resource has been made unavailable (turned off) we have been notified that the resource does exists, the server completely understands our request, but for us the resource is forbidden with a returned 403 HTTP status code. Unfortunately, when you turn off Glimpse either due to lack of authorization or simple because it isn’t available, navigating to its web resource /Glimpse.axd you are presented with the following error: A second favorable feature is the ability provides access controls to Glimpse’s control panel through security policies programmatically. One the great qualities of it are the at-your-finger-tips heads-up display that it uses to provide diagnostic information on requests. Glimpse is a diagnostic tool that many of you are probably very familiar with. Maybe you’ve even given up on the attempt. Unfortunately, if you have ever attempting to do so, you will have found it less than possible and far from easy. We can leverage this approach when we determine that it would be better to not disclose the existence of a resource, but return 404 instead of 403 HTTP status code. Though, security through obscurity is never in of itself reliable security, it can be and should be used as part of any security in-depth approach. For example, a valid case could be that a 3rd party web resource (.axd) had a known security flaw and could be taken advantage of through other side channels when knowing the resource exists. The disclosure of the resource might only provide a piece of the profile puzzle a malicious user was assembling or it might actually directly provide the user opportunities. However, by returning the applicable and valid 403, we have also made it clear that the resource does exist. One of those situations is when the resource is forbidden (403).Īn authorized user has requested a forbidden resource in which they receive a HTTP 403 forbidden response to the request is a common scenario. But it was obvious that in certain circumstances we can inadvertently disclose information that a malicious user could use to their advantage just by returning the real HTTP status code. In my last post on Security Misconfiguration, part of the discussion was on properly handling error messages to ensure we don’t expose sensitive data to our users. Sometimes the divulged information only fuels the profile the malicious user is assembling against your application or the information directly exposes a serious security weakness. Whether deep diving into OWASP’s Top 10 security flaws or as a direct topic, it is a security area that surfaces over and over again. When talking about web application security, one common denominator that repeatedly comes up is the act of disclosing sensitive application data.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |